Floodplain land-use decisions are made by individuals in households, businesses, and local governments. Whatever the venue, the decisions made are the outcome of multiple interacting influences, with one being consideration of flood risk. The goal of a flood risk communication program may be to improve the understanding of flood risk among those making decisions. An alternative goal may be to change the decisions made. Understanding how individuals make decisions and the mental strategies they employ, as well as understanding the larger context of decisionmaking, will contribute to better defining the goals of a flood risk communication program and then designing a program that will secure those goals.
Introduction
Federally planned and funded flood hazard reduction projects are no longer the focus of The agencies involved in managing flood risk have taken different approaches and have multiple programs to communicate flood risk. For example, the US Army Corps of Engineers has created a levee safety program 2 for flood hazard reduction infrastructure that may need renewal or upgrading when the original design performance of the structures is exceeded because of changing hydrology or changes in population and assets exposed to hazards. Given its limited federal budget allocations, the Corps' emphasis is on helping nonfederal units of government understand changes in flood risk-communication efforts-and take actions for levee enhancement and maintenance. The Corps has also developed the Silver Jackets program 3 to help communities appreciate their flood risk, become aware of federal programs available to them,  Fellow and resident scholar, respectively, Resources for the Future. The authors would like to thank the following individuals for helpful feedback and discussions on this paper: Paul Scodari, Doug Woolley, Mark Lorie, and Howard Kunreuther. 1 The term flood risk as used in this report refers to the likelihood of a flood (the flood hazard) and the adverse consequences to communities, households, and businesses if a flood does occur. For a rigorously developed comprehensive vocabulary of terms, see Shabman et al. (2014) . determinants of flood risk are the likelihood of the hazard and the consequences of the hazard if it occurs. As we will discuss, an individual's understanding of probability and likelihood as well as the consequences of flooding may differ from an expert's and vary across individuals. Individuals' evaluation of the consequences of flooding will also include their understanding and perception of federal flood risk programs and their role. 9 (The formation of expectations of flood risk is discussed in detail in Section 3.) Understanding of flood risk is only one of multiple interacting influences on floodplain land-use decisions.
Box. 1. Options for Floodplain Management
Decisions that affect flood risk rarely begin from a blank slate. Past hazard reduction project investments and land settlement choices can constrain or otherwise influence communities' and individuals' possible subsequent choices. For example, historically, people often settled in floodplains to realize the benefits of fertile soils, access to water transportation, and opportunities to be near the recreational and aesthetic amenities provided by proximity to bodies of water. Thus there are many places where people and assets are already in areas subject to flood risk, so the available measures for dealing with that flood risk may be limited. For example, moving structures and utilities on a large scale can be costly and is typically judged to be impractical or undesirable by the community and residents themselves. Individuals who own properties that experience flood damage (especially if flooding has been recent) will realize lower property values, which in turn reduce their ability to sell and move to safer locations; thus, rebuilding in place is often considered the best available option. In such cases, adjustments to flood risk might be the construction or improvement of a levee, some flood proofing, and increased purchase of insurance. A decision to construct or improve a levee could influence future flood risk reduction and management actions. Those future actions may be in response to changes in the economic value of the land in the floodplain, changes in the population settled in the floodplain, or changes in hydrology that have altered the flood hazard.
Local government decisionmaking related to floodplain land use is also highly constrained by physical topography. In some jurisdictions, the best available land for community expansion may have some flood risk, even if the likelihood of flooding is remote. In other jurisdictions, land available for development is well outside the floodplain. Communities also face different types of flood risks, such as slow and easily predicted rates of rise in a river due to rainfall or upstream snowmelt versus flash floods. And almost every community has small streams with relatively small drainage areas where flooding may result from rapid changes in the hydrograph during intense storm events; such stormwater flooding is especially prevalent in rapidly urbanizing areas.
Household Decisions
A household's 10 perceived expected "net benefits" 11 from a floodplain location are based on an evaluation of the amenities and dis-amenities from choosing that location. Amenities and dis-amenities can be divided into neighborhood and location characteristics and attributes of the specific property. Characteristics of the neighborhood or location include factors such as the crime rate and property tax rate; those of the specific location may include the size of the lot, layout of the structure, and proximity to public transit, the workplace, and recreational areas, such as beaches, trails, and parks. Of course, when deciding where to locate or whether to remain in a location, individuals also face a household budget constraint. In addition, local or federal regulations may constrain their choices. For example, households with a federally backed or regulated mortgage in a FEMA-mapped high flood risk area must purchase a flood insurance policy or local jurisdictions may regulate building in high-risk areas.
Some amenities, like water views and aquatic recreation, are directly associated with the flood risk at the property. Hence, a household may need to weigh the immediate and readily understood advantages of a property with the uncertain prospect of suffering the unfamiliar consequences of flooding (e.g., property replacement and repair, inconvenience, post flood trauma). Perceptions of the extent of federal pre flood and post flood assistance programs can affect the perceived cost of the location decision. 10 The word household refers to a renter or an owner-occupant, although flood damages experienced by a renter are limited to the contents of a residence. 11 The expected net benefits are the judgment made by the household (not by an outside observer) about the effect on its well-being from the location choice.
Business Decisions
Whether a business is a small proprietorship or a large corporation, it will base its decisions on the profitability of a location choice. Possible measures of profitability include return on investment, payback period in relation to expected time at that location, or positive cash flow. Location characteristics that can influence profitability include distance to suppliers, customers, competitors, complementary business, and skilled employees, plus transport access and goodwill based on longevity at the location. Some variables that can influence profitability may be associated with flood risk at the property: for example, proximity to navigable waters or the topography of the site. Joint consideration of these influences will yield expectations for profitability, which take into account the firm's evaluation and knowledge of potential flood losses.
The location decision is intertwined with-and can be influenced by-what the firm believes to be the flood risk reduction and management options available to it. If a business feels that it could take risk-reducing actions at a cost less than the returns for that location choice, it may be more likely to locate in a flood-prone area. A business may deem a floodplain location profitable if it believes that the cash flow will be adequate to pay for flood insurance premiums.
These profitability calculations depend on expected flood risk, which can vary across different businesses. Large corporations considering making investments in flood-prone areas may have the ability to carefully assess available data to determine flood risk. They may also have the assets to self-insure or otherwise absorb the risk of flood losses. Smaller businesses, especially proprietor-owned small businesses, may need to rely on publicly available information, which they may seek out to various extents. Or a small business may observe other, larger businesses that have located in the area and make inferences about flood risk based on their investment decisions. And, as for households, perceptions of federal pre flood and post flood assistance programs can affect the expected costs of the location decision.
Local Government Jurisdictions' Decisions
Household and business decisions are influenced by the decisions of local government jurisdictions. Local government decisions vary from issuing and enforcing land regulations to implementing a local flood hazard reduction project with tax implications for every resident of the community. These local government decisions are sometimes the outcome of a public debate that is finalized through a referendum. In other cases local decisions emerge from internal deliberations within the government bureaucracy and are approved by locally elected representatives.
Each decision is a result of who participates, the roles of the participants, and the rules by which a decision is made. The participants and the decision processes vary across and within communities. Those who believe they are most affected by any decision may be most vocal in expressing their views and attempting to influence the authorities. For any given decision, these "stakeholders" 12 may include neighborhood coalitions, labor groups, business and real estate interests, construction contractors, environmental groups, and other bureaus of government.
Local decision authorities-those with the legally sanctioned responsibility to take regulatory action, levy taxes and fees, and make spending decisions-are not supposed to be a blank slate on which the preferences of the most influential stakeholders are written. Rather, these authorities are expected to advance the general welfare of the citizens; as a general matter, most interpret that duty as securing a favorable business climate to increase jobs and incomes and tax revenues needed to support desired levels of public services within a local government budget.
To be sure, these local government decisions on floodplain land-use regulations and community hazard reduction are influenced by both stakeholder groups and community officials' perceptions of and attitudes toward flood likelihoods and potential consequences. But these are not the only considerations in any decision; trade-offs and budget constraints are always relevant.
This reality is best illustrated by an example. Imagine a decision on whether a new critical facility-a police station 13 -might be located at the inside edge of the 1 percent floodplain.
However, also suppose that a building is available and can be readily adapted to the police needs at a price affordable to the community, and there are other police stations that are not at risk of flooding. Also assume that the surrounding area has a high incidence of crime, which the new police facility is expected to deter. In this situation, even recognizing flood risk, a responsible decision might be locating the police station in the available but possibly flood-prone building.
12 Each stakeholder advocates to decision authorities for policies, programs, tax and spending decisions that will serve his or her objectives. At times, advocacy may be for self-serving decisions and at other times the decisions advanced may be argued to be good for the community as a whole. Indeed, the typical argument is that decisions that benefit a particular stakeholder also benefit the community at large. As one example, a land developer may argue that a zoning change to allow the construction of residential and commercial buildings in part of a floodplain will spin off jobs and create affordable housing. Meanwhile, other stakeholders may advocate for a bike path or park in that same area, arguing that this use of the land will add to the community's quality of life. 13 A police station is defined in Executive Order 11988 as a critical facility that should not be placed in that location.
Perceptions of and Attitudes toward Flood Risk
Flood risk communication programs seek to influence individuals' floodplain location and flood risk reduction and management choices. As just discussed, these choices are made by individuals in their roles in a household, business, or community. The preceding section described the larger context that may influence those choices. This section focuses on how individuals form an understanding of the likelihood of the flood hazard and the consequences of their exposure and vulnerability to the hazard.
Research in the behavioral sciences has explored individuals' attitudes toward risk as well as the ways in which individuals perceive that risk and act on that understanding.
Researchers have defined three categories of risk attitudes, found two systems of thinking, and within one system, identified mental shortcuts, called heuristics, which individuals may use when making decisions about risk. Differences in risk attitudes and how these may affect decisions about flood risk specifically are discussed first in Section 3.1, followed by explanation of the two systems of thinking and then the decision heuristics. In each section, implications for the understating of and acting on flood risk are noted.
One caution about this review is necessary. The literature is most often a report from a controlled experiment where a single heuristic from among many, or a focus on risk attitudes, is isolated in order to be studied. However, as will be evident, some heuristics taken in isolation will suggest one conclusion about how a decision would be made, and others taken in isolation will suggest a different decision. As a result, in a real-world setting, different individuals may employ different and contradictory heuristics or have different risk attitudes. Thus, an initial step in developing a risk communication program might be describing which system of thinking, risk attitude, and heuristics will govern an individual's choice making, but that may be difficult to do.
Risk Attitudes
Decisionmaking about flood risk requires the individual to recognize a range of possible outcomes of any decision and anticipate the likelihood of each and its associated net benefit. Attitudes toward flood risk refer to an individual's willingness to accept that risk. More specifically, some individuals can be risk averse, some risk seeking, and others risk neutral.
Risk-neutral individuals are indifferent to the likelihood of different outcomes and make decisions based on the expected value of all possible outcomes. Risk-averse individuals prefer a certain to an uncertain outcome, even if the expected benefit of all the possible uncertain outcomes could be greater. Risk seekers are the reverse, being willing to forgo the expected benefits of certain outcome with the hope of a much larger payoff.
Illustrations from business decisionmaking about floodplain location can be instructive in understanding how context may affect risk attitude. For example, consider two kinds of businesses making a decision about opening a store at the same location. If the store is part of a large chain that has many locations around the country, such that the loss of one store is not going to bankrupt the company, the business may base the decision on the expected profit. But if the store is the only outlet of a small business whose total assets and operations are in that one location, the owner might be risk averse and choose a less profitable location where the risk of bankruptcy due to a flood would be sharply reduced.
Beyond the effect of context, individuals may have a different risk attitude (willingness to accept risk) depending on their perceived nature of the risk or its consequences. Risk attitudes are known to be affected by whether individuals feel they have control over the risk, whether they accepted it voluntarily, and whether it could be catastrophic (Slovic 1987) . Returning to the business illustration above, the small business owner's risk attitude may depend on whether a flood could be catastrophic or cause only shallow flooding and minimal damage. 14 The behavioral findings discussed below indicate, however, that individuals may make decisions that differ from simple predictions based on risk attitudes or that risk attitudes can be more complex functions of the decisionmaking setting.
Systems of Thinking and Flood Risk Perception
The behavioral science literature often builds off a description of two different mental processes by which individuals receive, interpret, and then act on risk information (e.g., Kahneman 2013) . "System 1" describes "intuitive" choice-making that employs decision heuristics, or mental shortcuts. This leads to faster decisionmaking. (An extended discussion of System 1 thinking follows in the next section.) Individuals also have the capacity to employ "System 2" thinking, which allows for complex choice-making. System 2 thinking is considered a deliberative and time-consuming process that may rest on sophisticated analytical processes.
14 The lower expected damages in this illustration would be reflected in an expected net benefits decision criterion. If the decisionmaker was risk neutral, then the expected value would be the choice criterion. The risk attitude in this illustration is a result of an effect of the possibility of catastrophic loss on the choice criterion itself, making the individual risk averse. We can expect most individuals to use System 1 thinking when faced with flood risk decisionmaking. Indeed, expecting people to employ System 2 thinking for infrequent events (like flooding) may be unrealistic, since they would need to invest time in acquiring relevant information and converting complex information into an understanding of the risk, assessing how different actions will reduce and manage that risk, and finally assessing the relative benefits and costs of the actions they might take. 
Heuristics and Flood Risk Perceptions
The literature on System 1 thinking (mental shortcuts, or heuristics) is vast and has its own language (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1982) . This section summarizes some of this literature, with commentary on how particular heuristics may be relevant for flood risk perception. Although professional consensus on a "correct" list of heuristics is lacking, the 15 Experts are people with the credentials and skills needed to understand the likelihood and consequences of flooding. 16 A distinction is drawn between data and information. Data include measurements of physical phenomena and may extend to objective descriptions of policies and programs. Information is created by the interpretation of data. For example, historical measurements of stream flow are data, but a stage-frequency curve that relies on those data is information.
heuristics discussed in this section are well established in the literature and were chosen as most relevant to flood risk.
Availability
The Availability Heuristic suggests that people assess the likelihood of an event by how readily examples come to mind (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) . People assign relatively more weight to events that are salient and memorable, and for which there is vivid evidence (Rabin 1998) . Threats that are viewed as particularly salient because of recent experience or media coverage, for example, are easier to imagine and are thus assessed as more likely to occur.
The Availability Heuristic would cause an individual to assign a higher probability of future flooding at a location after a major flood, since the event is now salient and easier to finds that previous experience with a hazard increases risk perceptions; however, if previous experience was not associated with large adverse consequences for the individual, the opposite can occur (Wachinger et al. 2013) . Thus, it is also possible for previous experience to lead to an underestimation of risks of rare events (Burningham et al. 2008) . This carries over into nearmisses, where those who by chance were not hit by a disaster perceive a lower risk (Dillon et al. 2011 ).
Gambler's Fallacy
The Gambler's Fallacy is the belief that systems are self-correcting (Rabin 2002) . For example, after a coin has been tossed several times and come up heads each time, someone invoking the Gambler's Fallacy would think a tail was more likely on the next toss. This is one component of what Tversky and Kahneman (1982) refer to as the belief in the "law of small numbers." That is, individuals believe that small samples are representative of a population and that sampling is a self-correcting process.
With regard to flood risk, this heuristic helps explain why some individuals believe that two "100-year floods" (1 percent annual chance) will not occur in the same area within a few years' time. It also helps explain why people who go many years without experiencing a flood believe the area is not subject to flood hazard. Individuals conclude that, say, a decade without a flood is a representative sample of the risk, when in actuality, hundreds of years of observations would be needed to estimate the likelihood of severe flood events. The Gambler's Fallacy could make it difficult to discourage people from locating in a high flood hazard area or to encourage them to adopt risk reduction and management measures if the area has not flooded in recent years.
Interestingly, immediately after a flood, the Gambler's Fallacy could conceivably offset the Availability Heuristic for some people, though direct evidence for this possibility is limited. Although a recent flood may lead people to perceive a higher likelihood of future flooding in the area, the Gambler's Fallacy may lead some people to believe that the odds of another flood's occurring in the area in subsequent years have fallen. Which heuristic is dominant may depend on the language used to discuss the flood, such as whether it is referred to as a 100-year flood, a 1 percent chance flood, or some other term.
Truncation
Individuals sometimes ignore low-probability events or treat them as having zero probability of occurring (Kunreuther 1978; Camerer and Kunreuther 1989) . One hypothesis offered to explain this observation is that individuals have only a limited amount of time and mental energy to devote to contemplating risk, and if they did not dismiss some low-probability risks, they would become overburdened in decisionmaking (Kunreuther and Slovic 1978) . This could explain the hypothesis by some floodplain managers that property owners behind levees often seem to ignore the residual risk. This has been referred to as the "levee effect" (White 1945; Tobin 1995) . A study in Harris County, Texas, however, found that some households overestimate hurricane risk and evacuate when they do not need to (Dueñas-Osorio et al. 2012 ).
This contradiction of the truncation heuristic may be the result of the availability heuristic, if there have been recent storms.
Optimism
Individuals can be optimistic in assessing whether they will be victims of a disaster, often believing that they are less at risk than the average person (Camerer and Kunreuther 1989; Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2006) . This has been documented, to varying degrees, across different cultures (Gierlach et al. 2010) . Individuals often assess their personal risk as low, perhaps to reduce the stress caused by worry. This heuristic has been noted by the director of emergency management for King County, Washington, who was quoted in Time magazine as saying that people often have four stages of denial about earthquakes: "One is, it won't happen. Two is, if it does happen, it won't happen to me. Three: if it does happen to me, it won't be that bad. And four: if it happens to me and it's bad, there's nothing I can do to stop it anyway" (Ripley 2006 ). This same heuristic applies to flood risk. Surveys have found that individuals tend to believe they are unlikely to be victims of flooding even if they reside in a flood-prone area (Krasovskaia et al. 2001) . A study in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta of California found that residents behind levees do not fully understand their risk of being flooded, but it is unclear whether optimism or other factors played a role (Ludy and Kondolf 2012) .
Whether optimism or truncation is the reason individuals believe that they will not be flooded, even after being given risk information or seeing others experience a flood, is unclear, but the effect on decisionmaking is the same: they minimize the risk of flooding.
Certainty Effect
Individuals have been shown to place added value on certainty. This certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky 1979 ) is seen in the Russian roulette thought experiment of Richard Zeckhauser and cited by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . With a six-cylinder gun aimed at them, most people are willing to pay more to remove one bullet if it is the only bullet in the gun than if there are two (or more) bullets in the gun. That is, a reduction in risk from 1/6 to zero is worth more to them than the reduction from 2/6 to 1/6, even though they are equal reductions in the probability of death. Applied to flood risk, this may mean that individuals are willing to pay more for measures that would completely, or nearly completely, eliminate the likelihood of being flooded. Thus, if individuals believe that constructing a levee would reduce flood risk to near zero, then they may be willing to pay more for it than for other actions to prevent flooding. Even if they are informed of the residual risk from the levee, the truncation heuristic would suggest that that small residual likelihood may be treated as zero.
Framing Effect
How a question is asked or how a choice is presented may influence the response (e.g., Thaler and Sunstein 2008) . These so-called framing effects can offer important lessons for flood risk communication program design. One well-documented framing effect is that individuals tend to make decisions in relation to a reference point. If this reference point is current conditions, individuals tend to disproportionally stick with the status quo (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) , as shown by "opt in, opt out" experiments. For example, in some countries people are considered to be organ donors upon death unless they have explicitly stated otherwise.
In other countries, the opposite is true-people are assumed not to be donors unless they have explicitly given their prior consent. Under both situations, most individuals stay with the default option, and thus rates of organ donation are dramatically higher in countries where the default is to donate (Johnson and Goldstein 2003) . Similarly, when car insurers offer an option that limits drivers' rights to sue in exchange for lower premiums, sticking with the default choice is much more likely (Johnson et al. 1993 ). This research suggests that if flood insurance were the default and automatically renewed each year, but households were given an "opt out" option, more individuals might choose to carry flood insurance.
Another implication of the framing effect relates to understanding of natural disasters. It has been observed that whether a natural hazard is framed as an unavoidable "act of God" or as something caused by land development strategies can influence what risk management measures are chosen (Stefanovic 2003) . Regarding floods, Stefanovic suggests that the former framing leads people to seek hazard reduction measures such as levees, whereas the latter framing leads people to seek risk reduction by reducing their exposure and vulnerability.
A third implication of the framing effect is that how flood risk information is presented can alter risk perceptions. For example, an individual could think that an event characterized as a 100-year flood, or even a 1 percent chance flood, is less of a concern than a flood event characterized as having a 26 percent chance of occurring during the life of a 30-year mortgage, even though both characterizations depict the same risk.
Cascading and Herd Behavior (Peer Effects)
This heuristic suggests that what other people do can influence an individual's choice. Schelling's (1998) classic example is hockey helmets: a player did not want to be the only one wearing a helmet, so if no one else wore one, he would not either. But if some players wore them, other players would be willing to do so. Models of cascades and herding behavior, two specific types of "peer effects," demonstrate that an individual's choice is influenced by the decisions of others (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1998 ).
This effect has been used in behavioral research to explain asset investments, stock market crashes, cultural fads, capital allocation, technology adoption, and other phenomena where individuals may make choices that differ from the choices they would make if they had not observed the decisions of others.
In flood risk decisionmaking, an individual may implement a risk reduction action after observing a neighbor doing so. A third person may think that the risk is too low to justify the action, but after observing the first and second persons, she may revise her risk assessment and also adopt the measure. In this way, cascades of behavior can occur. For instance, a 2003 survey of Florida homeowners found that in neighborhoods with relatively high rates of hurricane shutter use, the shutters were of higher quality and were more likely to include envelope protection (measures to prevent roof failure during a hurricane) than the shutters used in neighborhoods with lower rates of shutter use (Peacock 2003) .
When and where this effect plays a role in decisionmaking deserves further research, as it is not always found to be important. For example, one survey found that cascading effects were not evident in the case of carrying flood insurance (Pynn and Ljung 1999) , perhaps because flood insurance is less visible to the neighbors than, for example, storm shutters.
Affect Heuristic
The Affect Heuristic causes individuals to mentally "tag" things as positive or negative and use these immediate emotions in making decisions (Finucane et al. 2000) . This emotional tagging can be used to evaluate risk, with individuals not wanting "good" things to be risky. As a result, individuals judge risks that have high benefits as being low, and vice versa (Alhakami and Slovic 1994; Finucane et al. 2000) . When situations are emotion-laden (affect rich), individuals have been found to overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities (Rottenstreich and Hsee 2001) . When negative affect (e.g., fear) is emphasized, as through viewing photographs of flood destruction, individuals perceive a greater risk associated with flooding (Keller et al. 2006) , and when tourists are fearful of hurricanes, they are more likely to evacuate (Villegas et al. 2013) . In general, it has been noted that emotional evaluation of risk can lead to different behavior than cognitive evaluation and that this can depart from what a nonemotional individual would view as the best choice (Loewenstein et al. 2001) . The Affect Heuristic could explain the link between experiencing a hazard and investing in flood risk reduction actions. One study found that those who had not experienced flooding strongly underestimated the negative affect of a flood (Siegrist and Gutscher 2008) .
Of special note in relation to flood risk, studies have found that individuals do not want to regret their decisions (Camerer and Kunreuther 1989) and consider ways to avoid regret when making decisions. In a recent experiment, individuals were more likely to indicate they would purchase insurance after suffering a hypothetical uninsured loss, and thus regret not having been insured (Kunreuther and Pauly 2014) . Also, individuals have been shown to consider multiple dimensions of a hazard and often put added importance on avoiding "dreaded" threats (Slovic 1987) . Fear has been shown to amplify perceptions of risk, whereas anger lowers risk perceptions (Slovic and Peters 2006) . Sometimes emotions can completely dominate an individual's risk analysis. When considering risk reduction and management actionsparticularly with respect to emotionally charged risks-individuals sometimes neglect the probability of a threat and focus entirely on the consequences (Sunstein 2002) . Thus, risk communication efforts that highlight the adverse consequences of flooding might make people more likely to adopt risk reduction and management actions. This may be especially justified in the risk communication program design if heuristics that lead to an underestimate of flood likelihood (Gambler's Fallacy, truncation) appear to be present.
Implications for Risk Communication
The discussion of heuristics has described how people might often evaluate risk information by employing mental shortcuts that could skew their understanding of flood risk. It has also shown that the same experiences, data, or information can be interpreted in completely different ways by different individuals or even the same individual in different contexts. As a result, it is difficult to predict which mental shortcuts will be dominant for which persons in which contexts. The assumption is that high-water marks can convey basic and objective data about flood possibilities and "improve the public's awareness of flood risk and encourage them to take action to reduce it." Given the preceding literature review, what can we say about high-water marks and risk understanding?
One possibility is that high-water marks will provide otherwise hard-to-acquire information on the severity of rare flood events and thus trigger System 2 thinking to evaluate these risks through deliberate, careful analysis. If the marks lead to appreciation of lowprobability risks that otherwise would be neglected, they may encourage risk reduction and management actions. Another possibility is that System 1, heuristic thinking will prevail, and then the question is which shortcuts will dominate people's evaluations. Perhaps the high-water marks will increase the salience of the risk and lead observers to perceive flood risk as higher. 
Implications for Risk Communication Program Goals
Flood risk communication may seek to increase individuals' understanding of flood risk so that they can make more informed choices when weighing the benefits and costs of location and risk reduction and mitigation decisions-that is, to encourage greater use of System 2 thinking about flood risk. A common approach involves two steps. First, the program provides individuals with data, interpretations of data, and perhaps simplified (but not simplistic) analytical processes for their use in understanding flood risk. Second, the conclusions from expert flood risk assessments are presented in formats and media such that a nonexpert's understanding of the flood risk will align with that of the experts. Individuals then evaluate the relative benefits and costs of a flood plain location decision and the merits of undertaking risk reduction and management measures.
That approach implicitly assumes that System 2 thinking will prevail. However, with limited time and attention and myriad other determinants of choices, individuals may never engage in a detailed analysis. Events that are remote in time and infrequently experienced may not be "worth thinking about," or people may not have time to consider every risk, from floods and hurricanes to nuclear disasters and epidemics. So it is reasonable to assume that in many instances individuals will employ System 1 thinking-despite efforts to promote System 2 thinking-and heuristics will influence decisionmaking. Recognizing this possibility has two implications for a risk communication program.
First, risk communication can be designed to harness decision heuristics in various ways, depending on the objectives of the program. For example, the Availability Heuristic could be used to develop flood risk communication efforts that consistently remind people of past flood events as a way to encourage them to assess risk as higher and therefore adopt risk reduction and management actions that they might otherwise not adopt. Here the goal is encouraging a certain choice and heuristics are used to motivate that choice. As another example, a well-recognized problem in flood risk communication is the public's misunderstanding of the term "100-year flood" (it leads them to fall prone to the Gamblers Fallacy). To avoid that misunderstanding, the thought has been to instead emphasize the concept of the 1% annual chance flood. However, people might then engage in truncation and consider 1 percent to be so small a likelihood that they ignore or dismiss the risk. Recognizing this, risk communicators have considered framing this flood probability as having a 26 percent chance of occurring during the life of a 30-year mortgage. When flooding is presented this way, individuals perceive a higher threat (Keller et al. 2006) , even though the basic information about flood risk is the same. The same result has been shown for risks from earthquakes and failing to wear a seatbelt and suggests that framing could offset the tendency of people to ignore or dismiss low-probability risks (Kunreuther et al. 2002) .
Second, risk communicators can set a different goal: directing individuals toward a particular decision (e.g., to purchase flood insurance, or to adopt building codes and zoning restrictions in floodplains). Guiding individuals toward particular choices, rather than simply providing data and information to inform choices, is what some authors call "nudges" (Thaler and Sunstein 2008 ). Thaler and Sunstein justify nudges by proposing the concept of "libertarian paternalism," in which individuals retain freedom to make choices but are encouraged in one direction or another by the way the choices or information is presented. That nudge might be in a direction that the experts believe is in the best interests of the individuals deemed to be at risk.
Or the nudge might be to secure a particular policy and program purpose. For example, reducing post flood disaster aid payouts may require nudging more individuals to participate in the NFIP.
Thaler and Sunstein refer to "choice architects," who design choice contexts so that people make choices that improve their lives; that is, choice architects can nudge people in beneficial directions. Choice architecture design uses knowledge of heuristics to direct choices in particular ways. Consider again the example of framing flood probability as a 26 percent chance over the course of a 30-year mortgage. Because this framing makes individuals perceive a higher threat, it nudges them toward taking flood risk reduction and management actions, as opposed to providing more or better information. Kuran and Sunstein (1999) link the Availability Heuristic with cascading behavior and develop the notion of "availability entrepreneurs"-individuals who work to trigger cascades "by fixing people's attention on specific problems, interpreting phenomena in particular ways, and attempting to raise the salience of certain information."
Clearly this falls in the category of using knowledge of decision heuristics to nudge decisions in a particular direction.
The Messenger and the Message
Individuals can receive information on flood risk from three types of sources: (1) official sources, such as flood insurance rate maps, government websites and published documents, statements by elected officials, and lenders; (2) their social network, including family, friends, and colleagues; and (3) their own personal experiences and observations. Individuals may not trust these sources equally and may discount information provided by certain sources. The literature shows that the level of trust that individuals place on the source of flood risk information plays a role in how they perceive and act on risks. They may be more likely to accept information when it comes from someone whose values they share, does not threaten their cultural values, and fits into their existing narratives (Kahan et al. 2010) . They must view the information as credible (scientifically accurate), salient (relevant to the issue), and legitimate (unbiased and fair) to trust and incorporate it into their decisionmaking (Cash et al. 2003) .
Transparency in communication can also increase trust in risk managers (e.g., White and Eiser 2006) .
Because this report focuses on risk communication programs, we discuss here official sources of risk information and the way risk is conveyed in these sources. Of particular note is that trust is much easier to destroy than create (e.g., Slovic 1993) . For that reason it is important to recognize the tension between providing information (or nudging) and earning trust. Program designers should keep three points in mind.
First, the risk communicator's message might be interpreted as self-serving and hence not trustworthy. For example, FEMA efforts to update maps and alter the area of the base floodplain have sometimes been interpreted as a way to sell more policies and thereby cover its fiscal deficit. Likewise, the Corps of Engineers' effort to describe the limits of its aging levees and encourage local efforts to reduce community exposure and vulnerability to flooding has been described by some stakeholders as a way to absolve itself of responsibility for any inadequacies of the levees.
Second, risk communicators should avoid presenting information as if it were neutral if they are embedding their own views of acceptable risks and justified risk reduction and management actions. Individuals may resist being nudged if the experts do not admit that they are offering expert advice based their own judgment. People may not reject expert advice, and may seek it out, but the experts must distinguish describing a risk situation from recommending how people should respond to that risk.
Third, risk communicators must accept the judgment of the individuals who face the complexity of making a place-based choice in consideration of their own sense of benefits, costs, and constraints. This can be difficult for risk experts, given the ample evidence that people simplify decisionmaking through heuristics. It is for this reason that Thaler and Sunstein proposed libertarian paternalism, under which the policy designer defines a "preferred choice," offers "expert advice," and can even nudge people toward a choice by conscious deployment and use of decision heuristics, but individuals can make a different choice.
One implication of those three points is that there may need to be a different messenger than the agency expert, even if the message is the same. Federal agencies can also increase the trust in their risk message by engaging households, business leaders, and community officials in a mutual exploration of the nature of flood risk and the appropriate response. A risk communication program might support analyses of the likelihoods and consequences of flooding through an extended stakeholder process, with sufficient time to foster System 2 thinking, to yield a more complete and more permanent understanding of flood risk. However, some people may not be able to commit the necessary time for such a learning process. The Corps has a longstanding commitment to improve its procedures for public participation in decisionmaking, but in practice "public participation" largely consists of technical experts speaking to communities and individuals. A recent report has recommended ways that the Corps could improve public participation in the context of the new emphasis on shared responsibility for flood risk management (Creighton et al. 2010) . The central message is that Corps public participation programs should move from the one-way transmission of information to engaging affected stakeholders in "mutual problem-solving." The report makes specific recommendations on involving local stakeholders in decisions about hazard reduction project rehabilitation and improvement.
Summary
Flood risk communication programs, whether motivated by a desire to increase understanding of flood risk or to nudge individuals toward particular choices, will introduce new information into an existing and already complex choice setting of financial and physical constraints, perceptions of benefits and costs of location choices, attitudes toward risk taking, and alternative systems of thinking. As a result, no risk communication program can guarantee that people's decisions will be different than they would have been in its absence.
In fact, improved understanding may not result in different choices. For instance, risk perception was not found to be correlated with evacuation decisions in North Carolina (Horney et al. 2010) . And a survey of homeowners in 10 cities found that only 40 percent of property owners who reported that they were aware they were in a floodplain area carried flood insurance, while only 13 percent of property owners who were unaware did so (Bollens et al. 1988 ). This finding suggests that although data and information on flood risk may affect choice behavior for some individuals, the complexity of their decision frameworks means that improved understanding of flood risk will not necessarily change everyone's choices. Having realistic expectations for the effect of flood risk understanding on choice making will be essential to the design and execution of a flood risk communication program.
